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with extreme rapidity. Concretely, when r is equal to $\pm .86$, the standard error is half as great as it ever will be; when r equals $\pm .50$, the standard error is seven eighths its maximum size. *The amount of error made in predicting from the regression equation on the basis of a correlation of $+.44$ is nine tenths as great as the error made in guessing on the basis of no information whatever.*

Does all this mean that a correlation of $+.45$ indicates that a test has no diagnostic value? Not at all; for values are relative things that depend upon the accuracy of diagnosis that particular situations demand. In the most objective terms, ϵ indicates that the root mean square error of estimation in predictions on the basis of the regression equation and a correlation of $+.45$ is nine tenths as great as the error that would be made in predicting by the same method on the basis of a correlation of $.00$. The investigator must decide for himself whether such reduction in the error of estimation makes the test valuable in the particular situation in which the test is to be used. The point of the present paper is to emphasize the necessity, in judging diagnostic value, of recognizing that the error of estimation is not reduced directly as the correlation is increased, of recognizing, for example, that a correlation of $+.60$ reduces the error of estimation only two tenths. I believe for these reasons that r is misleading, and that when diagnostic value is discussed, ϵ might be used as an index with advantage.

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REVIEWS AND ABSTRACTS OF LITERATURE

Egotism in German Philosophy. GEORGE SANTAYANA. London and Toronto: J. M. Dent and Sons, Ltd.; New York: Chas. Scribner's Sons. Pp. 171.

To the many hard things that are nowadays being said against Germany Mr. Santayana adds the accusation of Protestantism. That the Germans have long since adopted Luther as a patron saint and claimed him as exclusively their own, is well known. But this has commonly been cited as evidence of their tendency to nationalize and appropriate the common European heritage. Most of the critics of Germany have been themselves Protestants who were unwilling that their faith should be identified with the creed of a militant nationalism. Mr. Santayana has no such scruple. Their philosophy, he says, "is Protestant theology rationalized" (p. 22); and it is clear that so saying he means to disparage both German philosophy and Prot-

estant theology. But the argument is obscure, and scarcely convincing. Thus we are told that in the philosophy of Fichte and Hegel "the principal figures are not individuals, like the Creator, the Redeemer, and one's own soul, but nations and institutions." Now it is commonly supposed that it is Catholicism and not Protestantism which is institutional. In any case Mr Santayana himself says that Protestantism "is reformation essentially, in that every individual must reinterpret the Bible and the practises of the church in his own spirit" (p. 26). Again, "the Protestant precept to search the Scriptures, and the sense that every man must settle the highest questions for himself, have contributed to the zeal with which science and scholarship have been pursued in Germany" (pp. 28-29). This would seem to contradict not only the institutionalism which the author ascribes to Protestant Germany, but also the romantic illogicality, the pedantry, and above all the excessive docility or submissiveness which the German is supposed to show toward authority. Finally, Mr. Santayana presents us with two quite opposite versions of the spirit of the Protestant religion. On the one hand, Protestantism is a revival of primitive Christianity, a sort of religious experimentalism, in which the believer must renew the teaching and the practise of the church "in the light of his personal religious experience" (p. 26). But on the other hand, we are told that "it is of the essence of Protestantism and of German philosophy that religion should gradually drop its supernatural personages and comforting private hopes and be absorbed in the duty of living manfully and conscientiously the conventional life of this world. Positive religion, in fact, disappears . . . and there remains only a consecrated worldliness that is deliberate and imposed as a duty" (p. 23). The former of these two interpretations possesses a broad historical justification; the second would appear to reflect the author's first-hand acquaintance with New England Unitarianism. But in any case so ambiguous a version of "the Protestant heritage" can scarcely be expected to afford the key to the interpretation of a national culture.

"The soul of German philosophy," according to Mr. Santayana, is "egotism—subjectivity in thought and wilfulness in morals" (p. 6). It focusses on the media of knowledge, on its "veils and lenses," and thereby contradicts the very essence of knowledge, which is to report external objects. Thus "Hegel was a solemn sophist: he made discourse the key to reality" (p. 84). Transcendentalism is "this method of looking for reality within one's own breast" (p. 32); and of loving nature and history promiscuously as creatures of one's own making. Morally and spiritually this philosophy is a return to that primitive heathenism which "stands bravely before a painted world, covets some bauble, and defies

death;" to "the religion of the will, the faith which life has in itself because it is life, and in its aims because it is pursuing them" (p. 149). Such is the essential significance of Schopenhauer, Wagner, Nietzsche, and even Goethe.

Mr. Santayana's characterization of the German national genius is witty, apt, and irresistibly quotable. In the judgment of the present writer it is substantially true; as true, perhaps, as any such sweeping generalization can hope to be. Nevertheless, there are omissions and exaggerations in the account that are so obvious as to suggest caricature rather than criticism. Thus there is a sense in which it is true that transcendentalism is "looking for reality in one's own breast;" but this is by no means the whole of the truth, and it could be contended with much plausibility that it is the least important part of the truth. The dominant motive in Kant was not subjectivism, but rationalism. He was primarily concerned to re-establish the claims of exact science, to demonstrate the logical and mathematical structure of nature. Furthermore, Kant made important contributions to logic itself through his method of searching for presuppositions and postulates. It is true that he believed that the claims of exact science could be established only by regarding nature as phenomenal, and that his logic was confused by an admixture of grammar and psychology. But the fact remains that it is chiefly owing to Kant and his followers that philosophy has been diverted from sensationalism and the Platonic tradition kept alive. So much even realists must acknowledge. That the proponents of "creative intelligence" owe him an even greater debt need scarcely be remarked.

Mr. Santayana's account is similarly inadequate on the moral and spiritual side. Though he makes a brave effort, he is, in my judgment, quite unable to deduce from his formula of romantic heathenism such glaring traits of the German as his capacity for patient research and for organization, his pedantry, his dull sentimentality, his honesty, and law-abidingness. Heathenism, we are told, obeys "the inward and vital imperative which the bull obeys, when trusting absolutely in his own strength, rage, and courage, he follows a little red flag and his destiny this way and that way" (p. 153). But the fact is that the most notable thing about the German is his discipline. The best that the author can do to reconcile these contradictory opposites is to say that the real egotist will take his own subjective code so seriously that "he would feel it to be derogatory to his dignity, and contrary to his settled purpose to cheat at the game he has instituted" (p. 163). But this is not convincing. It is an ingenious paradox; but it leaves the reader with the feeling that it would have been better to admit that

when it comes to phenomena so complex as races and nations, some things must be left unexplained. For this reason the book before us suffers in comparison with Professor Dewey's *German Philosophy and Politics*. The latter is less literary and less entertaining; but perhaps for that very reason it conveys the impression of being more restrained and judicial. Furthermore, Professor Dewey is more skilful in his selection of a formula, for one can deduce at least twice as much from dualism as from egotism.

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Religious Values and Intellectual Consistency. EDWARD HARTMAN REISNER. New York: The Science Press. 1915. Pp. 59.

What do we mean nowadays by the words God and Religion? and can we really mean much of anything and yet be intellectually consistent? These are the questions that Dr. Reisner tries to answer in this book, which was his thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

The author defines religion as an emotional attitude towards the whole of one's experience, and as concerned with judgments of value. Therefore it demands intellectual consistency. The concept of God has always done duty as the guardian of values, and so an historical survey of the God concept may throw light on some of the difficulties of religious philosophy.

The author then gives an account of the growth of Christian dogma and its disintegration, due to the growth of science and to the fact that the critical philosophy of the eighteenth century undermined the intellectual foundations of classical Christianity. The followers of Kant tried to rebuild religion on a basis of absolute idealism. Dr. Reisner gives the usual criticism of Fichte, Hegel, and Royce, and finds that idealism and its absolute have not succeeded in finding a metaphysical basis for the concept of God which is intellectually consistent.

The author then attempts to analyze the concept of God as it exists to-day in the minds of educated people. He believes that any attempt to find a God through philosophy will fail—"God must exist to be discovered and described." He finds that the God concept of the present time is a name representative of certain values, and that "the conception of God as a Being represents an historical phase of religion that modern scientific knowledge finds no place for." Religion is a natural, psychological product and must be founded on an empirical basis. There are religious experiences that are genuine and real, and for the religious man who is also scientific, God might well be the name or symbol for these experiences. "God is the name for the reality of religious experiences; the religious